IC § IC 35-45-2-1. Intimidation.
(a) A person who communicates a threat to another person, with the intent:
(1) that the other person engage in conduct against the other person’s will;
(2) that the other person be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act; or
(i) a dwelling, a building, or other structure; or
(ii) a vehicle;
to be evacuated; or
(B) interfering with the occupancy of:
(i) a dwelling, building, or other structure; or
(ii) a vehicle;
commits intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor.
(b) However, the offense is a:
(1) Level 6 felony if:
(A) the threat is to commit a forcible felony;
(B) the person to whom the threat is communicated:
(i) is a law enforcement officer;
(ii) is a witness (or the spouse or child of a witness) in any pending criminal proceeding against the person making the threat;
(iii) is an employee of a school or school corporation;
(iv) is a community policing volunteer;
(v) is an employee of a court;
(vi) is an employee of a probation department;
(vii) is an employee of a community corrections program;
(viii) is an employee of a hospital, church, or religious organization; or
(ix) is a person that owns a building or structure that is open to the public or is an employee of the person;
and, except as provided in item (ii), the threat is communicated to the person because of the occupation, profession, employment status, or ownership status of the person as described in items (i) through (ix) or based on an act taken by the person within the scope of the occupation, profession, employment status, or ownership status of the person;
(C) the person has a prior unrelated conviction for an offense under this section concerning the same victim; or
(D) the threat is communicated using property, including electronic equipment or systems, of a school corporation or other governmental entity; and
(2) Level 5 felony if:
(A) while committing it, the person draws or uses a deadly weapon; or
(B) the person to whom the threat is communicated:
(i) is a judge or bailiff of any court; or
(ii) is a prosecuting attorney or a deputy prosecuting attorney.
(c) “Communicates” includes posting a message electronically, including on a social networking web site (as defined in IC 35-42-4-12(d)).
(d) “Threat” means an expression, by words or action, of an intention to:
(1) unlawfully injure the person threatened or another person, or damage property;
(2) unlawfully subject a person to physical confinement or restraint;
(3) commit a crime;
(4) unlawfully withhold official action, or cause such withholding;
(5) unlawfully withhold testimony or information with respect to another person’s legal claim or defense, except for a reasonable claim for witness fees or expenses;
(6) expose the person threatened to hatred, contempt, disgrace, or ridicule;
(7) falsely harm the credit or business reputation of the person threatened; or
(8) cause the evacuation of a dwelling, a building, another structure, or a vehicle.
– Δ told his landlord “I was bein[g] unprofessional, and . . . that . . . I should . . . go about my job a different way . . . . [A]nd then he basically told me I was a bitch. And . . . I said I’m just dropping the notice of claim [sic]. I’m not . . . here to do anything else. And then he threatened me. . . . He called me a bitch and then told me that if I came back on the property he’d kill me.” Δ argued that his threat was for a future act, not a prior act, as required by the statute. “The fact-finder was free to conclude, considering the substantial evidence, that Roar’s threat was in direct response to Olive’s lawful attempt to evict Roar’s sister.” “Mere use of conditional language in the course of communicating a threat does not vitiate the statute’s application when the factual predicate for the threat was a prior lawful act of the victim. Stated another way, the language a defendant uses in communicating a threat may be relevant to the fact-finder’s assessment of the defendant’s intent, but the language used is not the only relevant consideration.” Th conviction is affirmed. ? NE.2d ? (Ind. App. 2016).
– Even though the victim’s police report was “probably actionable” as a false report, her exaggeration of the facts did not excuse defendant from threatening to kill her in retaliation for petitioning the authorities for protection from him, and the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction for intimidation. Johnson v. State, 544 N.E.2d 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
– The elements of the offense of intimidation are: (1) communicating a threat, (2) to another person, (3) with the intent that the other person engage in conduct against his will. Bolen v. State, 430 N.E.2d 398, (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
– Defendant’s threatening to “get” the police officer and his family after being arrested, could reasonably be concluded to be a threat with the intent to place the officer in fear of retaliation for arresting the defendant. Townsend v. State, 753 N.E.2d 88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
– In order to sustain a conviction under the intimidation statute, IC 35-45-2-1, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to place the victim in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act, and when the state seeks to have a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent for committing an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult, the state must prove every element of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. H.J. v. State, 746 N.E.2d 400 (Ind. App. 2001).
– State presented no evidence that the individual caught defendant stealing water, and it was not until after the individual threatened to call the police that defendant drew the knife; while this might have been evidence that defendant intended to stop the individual from calling the police and intended to make him engage in conduct against his will, a crime, that was not how the charge was brought, and thus the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that defendant intended to put the individual in fear of retaliation for having caught him stealing water, which was an essential element of the crime as it was charged. Blackmon v. State, 32 N.E.3d 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
– Facts, which showed defendant raised his handgun to the window of his automobile for another driver to view, but the weapon was not pointed at the other driver or his vehicle, were insufficient to convict defendant of intimidation. Gaddis v. State, 680 N.E.2d 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
– Defendant did not communicate a “threat” within the meaning of the intimidation statute by merely lifting his jacket to show the off-duty police officer that he was in possession of a handgun. Johnson v. State, 743 N.E.2d 755 (Ind. 2001).
– Insufficient evidence supported defendant’s Class C felony conviction of intimidation since there was no evidence that defendant threatened victim while actually possessing knife as required by IC 35-45-2-1(b)(2); testimony indicated that defendant picked up knife after threatening victim. Hall v. State, 837 N.E.2d 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
There was insufficient evidence for an intimidation conviction under IC 35-45-2-1. Defendant’s threat to shoot his neighbor’s son-in-law if he came onto defendant’s property was aimed at a future trespass, not a prior lawful act; furthermore, there was insufficient evidence that defendant threatened the son-in-law for the prior lawful act of arguing, as defendant remained on his property, the jury had acquitted him of pointing a gun, the son-in-law was the first to engage in the yelling, and defendant was the first to call the police. Ransley v. State, 850 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
Evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of intimidation under IC 35-45-2-1(a) where the events leading up to the threats were not a part of the record, defendant never clarified her reasons for the threats, and thus, the conclusion that defendant’s aim must have been for the victim to leave the husband with whom defendant was having an affair was pure speculation. McCaskill v. State, 3 N.E.3d 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
– Evidence supported conviction for intimidation, where defendant used print, radio and television media to communicate threats that he knew or had good reason to believe would reach county prosecutor and another person, with the intent to influence the prosecutor’s conduct as a law enforcement officer against his will and to place the other person in fear of retaliation for having supported prosecutor’s request for death penalty against murder suspects, including defendant’s son. Ajabu v. State, 677 N.E.2d 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
– Evidence presented by state that defendant approached witness and warned him that he better not testify in prosecution of defendant for other offenses was sufficient to allow jury to conclude defendant was guilty of intimidation, and for case to be remanded for retrial without violation of the protections afforded by the double jeopardy clause. Williams v. State, 677 N.E.2d 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
-Where defendant made two obscene remarks and then displayed a firearm and told the off-duty, out-of-uniform police officer, “don’t even think it,” the evidence was sufficient for a trier of fact to conclude that defendant communicated a threat within the meaning of the intimidation statute. Johnson v. State, 743 N.E.2d 755 (Ind. 2001).
– Evidence that a defendant resisted a deputy who was transporting him to jail and that the defendant repeatedly told the deputy that he “was going to get” him and that the deputy had “better watch his back” was sufficient to establish the crime of intimidation because it showed that the defendant intended to place the deputy in fear due to his lawful act of transporting the defendant to jail; appellate court nevertheless reversed defendant’s in absentia conviction because the record did not show that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Slayton v. State, 755 N.E.2d 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
– Defendant committed the act of intimidation where defendant and the victim’s former wife drove up beside the victim and defendant brandished a gun while threatening the victim regarding the victim’s child visitation rights. Jones v. State, 775 N.E.2d 322 (Ind. App. 2002).
– Where defendant’s wife had obtained protective order against him, defendant’s statement to domestic violence advocate that “things were not going to be real pretty” if she continued to work with his wife was sufficient to support intimidation conviction. Huber v. State, 805 N.E.2d 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
– Evidence that defendant displayed a gun to the victim when defendant deliberately lifted up his shirt to reveal the gun in his waistband was sufficient to prove “use” for purpose of defendant’s intimidation conviction under IC 35-45-2-1. Daniels v. State, 957 N.E.2d 1025 (Ind. App. 2011).
– Defendant was properly convicted of intimidation under IC 35-45-2-1, stalking under IC 35-45-2-2, and harassment under IC 35-45-10-5 despite his claim that venue was improper. Under IC 35-32-2-1(k), venue was proper in the county that an out-of-state victim resided if the crime was committed by electronic communication, and it was undisputed that the events that gave rise to the charges occurred against one of the victims who lived in the county where defendant was tried. Eberle v. State, 942 N.E.2d 848 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
DISCLAIMER – The information contained on this website is provided for educational and informational purposes only, and should not be construed as legal advice or as an offer to perform legal services on any subject matter. The content of this web site contains general information and may not reflect current legal developments or information. The information is not guaranteed to be correct, complete or current. We make no warranty, expressed or implied, about the accuracy or reliability of the information at this website or at any other website to which it is linked. Recipients of content from this site should not act or refrain from acting on the basis of any information included in the site without seeking appropriate legal advice on the particular facts and circumstances at issue from an attorney licensed in the recipient’s state. Nothing herein is intended to create an attorney-client relationship and shall not be construed as legal advice. This is not an offer to represent you, nor is it intended to create an attorney-client relationship.