
If you are in need of a top-tier criminal defense attorney in Indiana, call me at 317-695-7700 for a free consultation or email me. I have been a criminal attorney in Indiana for my entire legal career, with nearly two decades of experience, and taught criminal law at the Indiana University School of Law. I have extensive experience with vehicle searches and suppression and taught this in my class at the law school. Indiana and Federal law generally prohibit warrantless searches, but there are many exceptions to this rule that are implicated when a vehicle is searched, as discussed in more detail below.
I was selected as one of the Top 100 Attorneys by the National Trial Lawyers. I have been recognized as a Top Ten Attorney in the State of Indiana by the American Institute of Criminal Law Attorneys. I was also recognized as a Top 10 Under 40 Criminal Defense Attorney by The National Academy of Criminal Defense Attorneys. I taught criminal law at the Indiana University School of Law and served as a Judge pro tem in Indiana. I filed the Federal Class Action lawsuit of Washington v. Marion County Prosecutor, in which Indiana’s vehicle forfeiture statute was held to be unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the US Constitution. I also co-authored the amicus brief for the United States Supreme Court case of Timbs v. State of Indiana, in which the United States Supreme Court held that Indiana’s attempts at forfeiture were unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause of the US Constitution. I handled over a dozen successful lawsuits against the Indiana Department of Corrections, challenging solitary confinement procedures under the Due Process Clause of the US Constitution. I also filed several successful lawsuits against the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department for arrests that violated the First Amendment of the US Constitution. Additionally, I have represented a fellow criminal defense attorney, an IMPD Police Officer, and two former Sheriff’s deputies after they were arrested and accused of illegal activity. As members of the legal community, these individuals spend a great deal of time in court and have firsthand experience with many different criminal lawyers. These individuals, having familiarity with many different criminal attorneys, were aware of the high quality of legal representation that I provide and trusted me to serve as their Indiana criminal defense lawyer. You can find additional information about my career as an Indiana criminal defense attorney and cases that I have handled on my In the News page.
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution generally prohibit warrantless searches, but several exceptions apply to vehicle searches, including the automobile exception, search incident to arrest, and inventory searches. These exceptions are often invoked in vehicle search cases, but they must meet strict constitutional standards. Below, I discuss relevant Indiana statutes and provide detailed analyses of key cases to illustrate how these exceptions are applied and when evidence can be suppressed.
Relevant Statutes for Vehicle Searches
-
IC 9-18-2-43: Duties of Law Enforcement Officer for Unregistered or Unlicensed Vehicles
This statute mandates that law enforcement officers take custody of a vehicle lacking proper registration or license plates and store it until the legal owner is identified or proper documentation is obtained. Specifically, it states:-
Officers “shall take the vehicle into the officer’s custody” and “may cause the vehicle to be taken to and stored in a suitable place” until the owner is found or registration is secured (IC 9-18-2-43(a)).
-
Exceptions exist for vehicles carrying perishable commodities or livestock, where officers have discretion in impoundment (IC 9-18-2-43(b)).
This statute is critical in cases involving inventory searches following impoundment, and improper application can lead to suppression of evidence.
-
-
IMPD General Order 7.3: Towing and Searching Vehicles
This Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department policy governs the towing and searching of vehicles, particularly in the context of inventory searches conducted after impoundment. Compliance with this order is essential for a search to be lawful, and violations—such as failing to follow standardized procedures—can provide grounds for a suppression motion.
Key Case Law on Vehicle Searches
The following cases provide detailed insight into the application of vehicle search exceptions in Indiana, highlighting the facts, legal reasoning, and their importance for suppression motions. Each case demonstrates specific circumstances under which searches may be upheld or deemed unconstitutional.
Gonser v. State, 843 N.E.2d 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
- Facts: Police received a report alleging that the defendant stole a clock. An officer encountered the defendant in the parking area of his apartment complex, near mailboxes, and positioned his patrol car to block the defendant’s vehicle, preventing him from parking. The officer called for a tow truck to impound the vehicle without attempting to verify ownership or registration on-site. The vehicle was towed to a towing company’s facility, where police conducted a search, discovering methamphetamine under the driver’s seat, a switchblade knife (location unspecified), and the stolen clock. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search was unconstitutional.
Legal Analysis: The court evaluated the search under three exceptions:
-
Automobile Exception: The State argued that probable cause to believe the vehicle contained the stolen clock justified the search. The court rejected this, noting that the scope of a warrantless search under the automobile exception must be limited to the object of probable cause (the clock) and the places where it could reasonably be found. The record did not specify whether the methamphetamine and knife were found before or after the clock, nor where the knife was located. This lack of clarity prevented the court from determining whether the search exceeded its permissible scope, and the State failed to meet its burden to justify the search under this exception (Gonser at 949-950).
-
Search Incident to Arrest: The search occurred after the defendant’s arrest and after the vehicle was towed to a separate location, making it neither contemporaneous nor within the defendant’s immediate control. The court held that searches incident to arrest are justified by the need to seize weapons or prevent evidence destruction, but these concerns are absent when the search is remote in time or place. Thus, this exception did not apply (Gonser at 950).
-
Inventory Search: The State claimed the search was a valid inventory search following impoundment. However, the court found the impoundment itself improper, as the vehicle posed no threat to the community and was parked in a private lot. Additionally, the State failed to introduce evidence of the towing company’s inventory policy at the suppression hearing, submitting it only later as an exhibit, which the court refused to consider. Without evidence of standardized procedures, the inventory search was invalid (Gonser at 951).
-
Significance: The court granted the suppression motion, emphasizing that police must adhere to strict constitutional limits on warrantless searches. This case is critical for defendants, as it highlights multiple grounds for suppression: improper impoundment, overbroad search scope, and failure to follow inventory protocols. It underscores the importance of challenging the justification and execution of vehicle searches.
Howard v. State, 818 N.E.2d 469 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)
- Facts: During a seatbelt enforcement zone, officers stationed at two locations identified drivers not wearing seatbelts. The defendant was observed driving without a seatbelt and was directed to pull into a parking lot. He provided a false name, had no identification, struggled to recall his birth date, and did not know his social security number. The officer noticed a knife hooked to his pants and asked him to exit the vehicle to remove it, revealing a wallet in his back pocket. After discovering the defendant’s true identity and arresting him for false informing, police learned he did not own the vehicle, the license plate was not registered to it, and he was a habitual traffic violator (HTV). The defendant requested that a friend drive the vehicle home, but police impounded it. An inventory search revealed drugs, and the defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search was illegal.
- Legal Analysis: The court upheld the search, citing IC 9-22-1-5, which permits impoundment when a vehicle is in the possession of someone other than the owner and the driver cannot establish rightful possession. The defendant’s lack of ownership, improper registration, and HTV status justified the impoundment. The inventory search was conducted per standard procedures, making it lawful. The court rejected the suppression motion, as the impoundment and search complied with statutory and departmental guidelines.
- Significance: This case illustrates the importance of statutory authority in justifying impoundment and inventory searches. It also highlights the need for defendants to challenge whether police followed proper procedures or had a valid basis for impoundment, as deviations can lead to suppression.
Ratliff v. State, 770 N.E.2d 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
- Facts: Police conducted a controlled drug buy, where an informant purchased drugs from the defendant. The defendant placed a bag of drugs in his truck and, after the transaction, attempted to flee, crashing into another vehicle in a parking lot, obstructing traffic. Following his arrest, police impounded the truck, and an inventory search revealed $30,000 in cash. The defendant moved to suppress the cash, arguing the search was unconstitutional.
- Legal Analysis: The court upheld the search under the community caretaking function, as the truck was obstructing traffic and was effectively “abandoned” due to the defendant’s arrest. The impoundment was necessary to ensure public safety, and the inventory search followed standard procedures. The court noted that impoundment is warranted when a vehicle poses a threat or harm to the community, consistent with objective standards of sound policing and established departmental routines (Ratliff at 809-810). The search was deemed lawful, and the suppression motion was denied.
- Significance: This case clarifies the community caretaking function as a basis for impoundment, emphasizing that police must demonstrate a legitimate public safety concern. Defendants can challenge such searches if the impoundment lacks a clear justification or deviates from policy, making this case a key precedent for suppression motions.
Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427 (Ind. 2010)
- Facts: Police responded to a shots-fired call and observed the defendant placing a cylindrical object in the trunk of his vehicle, parked in a private parking lot. He was arrested for public intoxication, and police found shotgun shells in his pocket. An inventory search of the vehicle revealed a shotgun in the trunk. The defendant challenged the search on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing the impoundment was improper.
- Legal Analysis: The court ruled the search unconstitutional, as the vehicle was neatly parked in a secure private lot, posed no threat to the community, and was not at risk of damage. The officer’s speculative concern that the vehicle “might be damaged” was insufficient to justify impoundment under the community caretaking function. The court emphasized that inventory searches are valid only when the impoundment is warranted, either by statute or as part of routine administrative functions, and must align with established departmental policies. The absence of a complaint from the property owner and the defendant’s lawful possession of the vehicle further undermined the impoundment’s legitimacy (Fair at 431-434). The suppression motion should have been granted.
- Significance: This case is a cornerstone for challenging inventory searches, as it limits impoundment to situations with clear public safety or statutory justification. It provides defendants with strong grounds to suppress evidence when police rely on pretextual or speculative reasons for impoundment.
State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind. 2010)
- Facts: Police observed the defendant working at a restaurant and saw him place something in his vehicle. He was arrested inside the restaurant on a felony warrant. A drug-sniffing dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in the vehicle, parked in a public lot. Without a warrant or the defendant’s consent, police searched the vehicle and found drugs. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing violations of the Fourth Amendment and Indiana Constitution.
Legal Analysis:- Fourth Amendment: The court upheld the search under the automobile exception, as the vehicle was in a non-residential public parking lot and readily mobile. The dog’s alert provided probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband, satisfying the exception’s requirements. The court noted that vehicles in non-residential areas have a reduced expectation of privacy, and the risk of evidence disappearing justifies warrantless searches. The search incident to arrest exception did not apply, as the defendant was secured inside the restaurant, far from the vehicle, and the arrest was for an unrelated crime, negating the need to preserve evidence of the crime of arrest.
- Indiana Constitution (Article 1, Section 11): The court found the search reasonable under Indiana’s reasonableness standard, as it caused minimal disruption (the defendant was already under arrest) and was supported by probable cause from the dog sniff. The officers’ actions aligned with the need to secure evidence promptly (Hobbs at 1286-1287).
- Significance: This case highlights the broad applicability of the automobile exception in non-residential settings and the importance of probable cause. It also demonstrates the distinct analysis under Indiana’s Constitution, which focuses on reasonableness and can provide additional grounds for suppression if police actions are deemed excessive.
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)
- Facts: In this U.S. Supreme Court case, police had probable cause to believe a motor home used as a residence contained drugs. They searched it without a warrant, and the defendant challenged the search.
- Legal Analysis: The Court upheld the search under the automobile exception, citing two justifications: (1) vehicles are readily mobile, creating a risk that evidence may disappear while a warrant is obtained, and (2) individuals have a reduced expectation of privacy in vehicles used on public highways. The exception applies to vehicles capable of mobility in non-residential areas, even if used as temporary residences (Carney at 392-394).
- Significance: This foundational precedent shapes Indiana vehicle search law by defining the automobile exception’s scope. It is frequently cited to justify warrantless searches of mobile vehicles in non-residential areas, but defendants can challenge its application if probable cause is lacking or the vehicle is in a residential setting.
Suppression of Evidence
Evidence obtained from an unlawful vehicle search may be suppressed through a motion to suppress. Common grounds include:
-
Lack of Probable Cause: The automobile exception requires specific probable cause, and searches exceeding this scope are invalid (e.g., Gonser).
-
Improper Search Incident to Arrest: Searches must be contemporaneous and limited to the arrestee’s immediate control (e.g., Gonser, Hobbs).
-
Unlawful Impoundment: Inventory searches require a valid impoundment supported by statute or community caretaking needs, with adherence to standardized procedures (e.g., Fair, Howard).
-
Violation of Indiana’s Reasonableness Standard: Article 1, Section 11 requires searches to be reasonable under the totality of circumstances, offering an additional layer of protection (e.g., Hobbs).
Contact My Office for a Free Consultation
Phone: 317-695-7700
Email: jeffcardella@cardellalawoffice.com
I handle cases throughout all of Indiana, including the Federal District Courts and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The main geographic areas that I practice law in are:
- Indianapolis, Indiana (for both Criminal Defense and Expungement)
- Noblesville, Carmel & Fishers, Hamilton County, Indiana (for both Criminal Defense and Expungement)
- Danville, Plainfield & Avon, Hendricks County, Indiana (for both Criminal Defense and Expungement)
- Franklin & Greenwood, Johnson County, Indiana (for both Criminal Defense and Expungement)
- Muncie, Delaware County, Indiana (for both Criminal Defense and Expungement)
- Bloomington, Monroe County, Indiana (for both Criminal Defense and Expungement)
- Anderson, Madison County, Indiana (for both Criminal Defense and Expungement)
- Lebanon & Zionsville, Boone County, Indiana (for both Criminal Defense and Expungement)
- Shelbyville, Shelby County, Indiana (for both Criminal Defense and Expungement)
- Martinsville, Mooresville & Morgantown, Morgan County, Indiana (for both Criminal Defense and Expungement)
DISCLAIMER – The information contained on this website is provided for educational and informational purposes only and should not be construed as legal advice or as an offer to perform legal services on any subject matter. The content of this website contains general information and may not reflect current legal developments or information. The information is not guaranteed to be correct, complete, or current. We make no warranty, expressed or implied, about the accuracy or reliability of the information at this website or at any other website to which it is linked. Recipients of content from this site should not act or refrain from acting on the basis of any information included in the site without seeking appropriate legal advice on the particular facts and circumstances at issue from an Indiana Criminal Defense attorney or an attorney licensed in the recipient’s state. Nothing herein is intended to create an attorney-client relationship and shall not be construed as legal advice. This is not an offer to represent you, nor is it intended to create an attorney-client relationship.