Suppression Attorney in Indiana

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Indiana Suppression Lawyer Jeff Cardella

The Good Faith Exception

The Free to Leave Doctrine

Vehicle Inventory Searches

Suppression Based on Unreasonable or Dangerous Actions on the Part of the Police

Miranda Rights

Pirtle Rights

How to Suppress a Warrantless Search and Seizure During Trial

Chain of Custody

Indiana Sample Motion to Suppress Evidence

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Indiana’s Immediately Apparent Doctrine

The legal theory referred to as “the immediately apparent doctrine,” also commonly known as the “plain feel” exception, originated from the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in Minnesota v. Dickerson (508 U.S. 366, 1993). This critical legal principle permits a police officer, during a valid protective pat-down (a Terry stop), to legally seize an object if its nature as contraband is instantly and unequivocally recognizable through the sense of touch. The key requirement is that the incriminating character must be immediately apparent; the officer cannot manipulate or further search the item to confirm their suspicion. In Indiana, the application of this specific doctrine is strictly governed by the foundational principles established in Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1, 1968), which narrowly authorizes a superficial search—a pat-down of the outer clothing—solely for the purpose of detecting weapons and ensuring officer safety. The courts rigorously enforce the constraint that the protective scope of the Terry search cannot be expanded into a general exploratory search for evidence. This narrow construction is vital for preventing unauthorized “fishing expeditions” where an officer uses the pretense of a safety check to hunt for drugs or other non-weapon contraband. The officer must be able to articulate, with high specificity, the objective facts that made the item’s unlawful nature obvious upon first touch. The moment the officer’s tactile sense confirms the absence of a weapon, the legal justification for the continued pat-down dissipates. This delicate balance protects both police effectiveness and the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens against unreasonable searches. If you want to learn more about this topic, click the following link for a more in-depth analysis of the immediately apparent doctrine.

 Does Indiana Use The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine? 

 Traditionally, Indiana courts have interpreted Article 1, Section 11—mirroring the Fourth Amendment but affording greater individual protections—as mandating the suppression of all evidence derived from unconstitutional searches, without exceptions like inevitable discovery.

However, in 2018, this was called into question after Winborn v. State, 100 N.E.3d 710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), where a unanimous panel admitted evidence under inevitable discovery for the first time—explicitly under the Fourth Amendment, not the Indiana Constitution. Indiana’s inevitable discovery jurisprudence embodies the tension between uniform federal standards and localized protections. The doctrine thrives federally but falters state-side, with Winborn‘s legacy a catalyst for debate rather than consensus. Today, the question is still open to debate. Click here for a more detailed look at how Indiana Courts have dealt with the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine.

The Good Faith Exception

The good faith exception, established by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Leon (1984), allows evidence obtained through a defective warrant to be admitted in court if law enforcement officers acted in good faith, reasonably believing the warrant was valid. This exception balances deterring police misconduct with ensuring justice isn’t undermined by technical errors, such as a judge’s mistake. However, the exception does not apply in certain cases:

1. The warrant was based on false information knowingly or recklessly provided by the affiant.

2. The warrant is facially deficient, lacking basic elements required for validity.

3. The affidavit supporting the warrant lacks indicia of probable cause.

4. The issuing judge or magistrate abandoned their neutral and detached judicial role (Cutter v. State, 646 N.E.2d 704, 714-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

Click here to read a more detailed analysis of the Good Faith exception to the warrant requirement.

The Free to Leave Doctrine

Traffic Stops by Undercover Unmarked Police

Indiana Code § 9-30-2-2 requires that an officer who makes a traffic stop (1) Wear a distinctive uniform and badge of authority; or (2) Operate a motor vehicle clearly marked as a police vehicle—such that it is evident to casual observation that the individual or vehicle is affiliated with law enforcement. Indiana Courts have generally strictly upheld this statutory requirement.  Click the following link to read the case law on undercover police making traffic stops in unmarked vehicles.

Can police stop my vehicle for a Broken Windshield?

When police see an individual driving a car, and the police want to stop the vehicle, they need a legal reason to do so. One of the excuses that law enforcement sometimes uses to stop vehicles is the presence of a broken windshield. However, it is not technically illegal to have a broken windshield. IC 9-19-19-2 Requires that most motor vehicles be equipped with a front windshield and IC 9-21-8-49 prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle with equipment that is not in good working condition or is improperly adjusted. From the case law, a stop is justified only if the officer can articulate how the crack creates an unsafe condition—e.g., obstructing peripheral vision, risking shattering, or endangering others. Minor, non-obstructive cracks (like small chips) likely do not meet the reasonable suspicion threshold, as they do not violate safety statutes. Click on the following link for an in depth analysis of whether the police stop your vehicle for having a broken windshield.

Do Pill Bottles Create Probable Cause for a Search?

In Harris v. State, 878 N.E.2d 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), a Department of Child Services (DCS) employee and Officer Gregory Hood responded to a tip about a possible methamphetamine lab in a basement. With the occupant’s consent to enter, Officer Hood observed items suggestive of drug use, including aluminum foil with burned residue, pipes, and starter fluid. The defendant, Harris, was found hiding behind a water heater and was detained in handcuffs for safety. During a pat-down, Officer Hood removed a blue plastic pill bottle, a knife, and a key ring from Harris’s pocket. By shining a flashlight through the bottle, he observed a baggie and a powdery substance, suspected to be a controlled substance. He opened the bottle, confirmed the presence of methamphetamine, and arrested Harris after discovering an outstanding warrant. The Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that opening the bottle exceeded the scope of a Terry search, and ordered that the evidence be excluded.  Generally speaking, a pill bottle, on its own, does not create grounds for a search. If you want to learn more about this topic, click the following link for a more in depth analysis of whether pill bottles create probable cause for a search. 

Do Plastic Bags Create Probable Cause for a Search?

An issue that arises surprisingly often in search and seizure is whether plastic bags create probable cause for a search.  Courts have held “It is not the primary purpose of plastic bags to hold illegal drugs, and the fact that an officer has first-hand experience with plastic bags containing drugs cannot, without more, provide probable cause to seize each plastic bag the officer may encounter. Moreover, . . . the fact that the appellant was in an area known for drug activity and the fact that he had a clear plastic bag in his pocket that was partially exposed do not by themselves, or taken together, constitute sufficient facts and circumstances upon which to base a finding of probable cause to search.” Abner v. State, 741 So.2d 440 (Ala.Ct.App. 1998). Click the following link for a more in depth analysis of whether or not plastic bags create probable cause for a search.    

Suppression based on Unreasonable or Dangerous Actions on the Part of the Police

When police actions veer into the unreasonable or dangerous—particularly when they create or exacerbate risks to public safety—suppression of evidence becomes a potent remedy to deter such conduct. In Osborne v. State, 805 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), the Indiana Court of Appeals established a clear boundary for police conduct that endangers the public. Police officers suspected Osborne, who was on home detention for a prior OWI conviction, of being intoxicated during a phone call. Rather than investigating safely, they directed him to drive to a police station (knowingly violating his detention terms and encouraging operation of a vehicle while impaired). En route, Osborne sped through a residential area, prompting a traffic stop where officers confirmed his intoxication. By creating the danger, the police undermined public safety, leading to suppression of all evidence from the stop. Click the following link to read a  more detailed discussion about Suppression based on Unreasonable or Dangerous Actions on the Part of the Police.

Miranda Rights

The landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), established that statements obtained from a defendant during custodial interrogation are inadmissible in court unless the defendant was first informed of specific constitutional rights and voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived those rights. The Court explained: “The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” This page discusses the Miranda doctrine and its evolution through case law over time, with a focus on its application in Indiana. Click the following link for a more in depth analysis of Miranda Rights.

Pirtle Rights

The Pirtle doctrine, established by the Indiana Supreme Court, originates from Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, which states, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated.” This provision, while similar to the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, has been interpreted by Indiana courts to provide broader protections in the context of custodial consent searches. Unlike the federal Miranda warnings, which protect against self-incrimination during custodial interrogations, Pirtle addresses the coercive nature of obtaining consent to search from a person deprived of liberty. The doctrine acknowledges that custody inherently creates a presumption of involuntariness in consent, requiring advisement of the right to counsel to ensure any waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Click the following link for a more in depth analysis of Pirtle Rights.