Indiana Suppression Law: The Free to Leave Doctrine

Indiana Suppression Law The Free to Leave Doctrine By Criminal Attorney Jeff Cardella

If you are in need of a top rated criminal defense attorney in Indiana, call me at 317-695-7700 for a free consultation or email me. I have been a criminal attorney in Indiana for my entire legal career, with nearly two decades of experience, and taught criminal law at the Indiana University School of Law. I have extensive experience with Suppression Law and taught Suppression as part of my course at the law school. A common question that arises in many cases is whether or not a person is free to leave, for purposes of Miranda. The answer to this question can be the difference between a conviction and an acquittal. We will discuss the case law on this topic more below.

Why the Free to Leave Doctrine Is Important

The Free to Leave Doctrine is a cornerstone of constitutional protections under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. It safeguards individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by ensuring police interactions remain consensual unless justified by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The doctrine determines when an encounter with law enforcement becomes a “seizure,” triggering constitutional scrutiny. If a reasonable person would not feel free to leave due to coercive police actions—such as retaining identification, displaying weapons, or issuing commands—any evidence obtained may be deemed inadmissible in court. This principle is critical because it can lead to the suppression of evidence, potentially resulting in the dismissal of charges or an acquittal, preserving individual liberty and holding law enforcement accountable to constitutional standards.

Indiana courts have applied the free to leave doctrine in various contexts, emphasizing that even brief detentions must be justified. Below, I discuss some of the relevant cases.  It is important to remember that entire books could be written on this topic and there are thousands of published decisions which deal with this doctrine.  The following list is not exhaustive, but should provide a good basic introduction to the case law: 

State v. Linck, 708 N.E.2d 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)

In this case, police responded to a complaint of illegal drug use at Linck’s apartment. Upon knocking and entering with consent, officers smelled marijuana and informed Linck of the complaint. Linck admitted to smoking a joint and handed over additional marijuana. He later sought to suppress his statements and the evidence, arguing he was in custody without Miranda warnings.

The court held that custody for Miranda purposes exists when a person’s freedom is significantly deprived, or a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, based on objective circumstances. Here, after Linck’s admission to illegal activity, officers did not inform him he could leave, escalating the encounter into custody. The court noted: “By informing the officers that he had just smoked the marijuana, [Linck] admitted to engaging in illegal activity… At no time did the officers inform Linck that he was free to leave… a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave.” This ruling underscores how admissions during an encounter can transform it into a custodial interrogation, requiring suppression if rights are not read.

Dowdell v. State, 747 N.E.2d 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)

Dowdell involved a police officer in a marked vehicle who pulled up and called the defendant over. The court analyzed whether this constituted a seizure. It concluded: “A reasonable person when faced with a police officer pulling up to him in a marked vehicle and calling for him to come over to the car would not assume that he can just turn and walk away.”

This brief but pointed decision highlights how authoritative commands, even without physical restraint, can make a reasonable person feel detained. It illustrates the low threshold for when a consensual encounter becomes an investigatory stop, requiring reasonable suspicion—absent here, leading to potential suppression.

State v. Calmes, 894 N.E.2d 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)

Officers approached Calmes at a gas station after observing him speaking with a woman. They requested ID, ran a check, and asked if he was armed. Calmes admitted to having a knife, reached for it, and was ordered to turn around with hands behind his head; cocaine then fell from his hands. Calmes moved to suppress, claiming no reasonable suspicion for the detention.

The court outlined three levels of police investigation: (1) arrests requiring probable cause, (2) brief investigatory stops (Terry stops) requiring reasonable suspicion, and (3) consensual encounters with no Fourth Amendment implications. It emphasized: “As long as an individual remains free to leave, the encounter is consensual… Factors to be considered include: (1) the threatening presence of several officers, (2) the display of a weapon by an officer, (3) the physical touching of the person, or (4) the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance might be compelled.”

Upon being asked about weapons while his ID was retained, the court found: “[U]pon being asked if he was armed, a reasonable person in Calmes’s position would not feel free simply to terminate the encounter, leave his license with the police, and walk away.” The retention of ID and escalating commands turned the interaction into a seizure without justification, warranting suppression. This case provides a clear framework for evaluating free to leave claims in Indiana.

U.S. v. Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir. 1983)

Though a federal case, Thompson is persuasive in Indiana suppression analyses, as state courts often look to federal precedents for Fourth Amendment guidance. Here, an officer approached Thompson in an airport parking lot, noticed suspicious behavior, requested ID, and—while retaining it—asked for a vial Thompson was holding. Thompson admitted it might contain cocaine.

The court ruled: “Fourth Amendment safeguards come into play where there is a show of official authority such that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.” Retaining the driver’s license “effectively immobilized” Thompson, as driving away without it could lead to arrest. The encounter thus matured into a seizure without reasonable suspicion, and the motion to suppress was granted.

This case emphasizes how withholding identification is a key coercive factor, a principle echoed in Indiana decisions like Calmes.

These cases demonstrate that subtle police actions can quickly erode a person’s freedom to leave, providing grounds for suppression motions. If you’ve been detained without justification, evidence against you may be inadmissible.

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Phone: 317-695-7700

Email: jeffcardella@cardellalawoffice.com

I handle cases throughout all of Indiana, including the Federal District Courts and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The main geographic areas that I practice law in are:

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